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THE INCREASING NEED FOR ARBITRATION IN ACTION SPORTS 
By  
Rachel Bires* 
 
 The popularity of Action Sports has steadily been rising since the 
introduction of widely-televised events, especially with events such as the ESPN 
X-Games. Joe Tomlinson, an author who has written several books on the topic of 
extreme sports, lists nine air sports, eighteen land sports, and fifteen water sports 
that are considered “extreme sports,” now dubbed “action sports,” in his book 
entitled, “Extreme Sports.”1 Due to the amount of sports that are considered Action 
Sports, particularly the sports that are included in the ESPN X-Games, there is a 
growing need for arbitration for all parties involved. These action sports, especially 
Skateboarding and Bicycle Motocross (“BMX”), which are increasing in 
popularity both in the United States and internationally, would benefit from 
arbitral clauses in various aspects of their sports, including endorsement contracts 
and in the dispute resolution clauses of the bylaws of their governing bodies for 
recognition by the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) for potential 
Olympic competition.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world of action sports is growing in popularity. With big name 
athletes serving as role models, such as Tony Hawk, Dave Mirra, Mat Hoffman, 
Shaun White, and Ryan Sheckler, more and more children and young adults are 
being drawn into the sports in the role as either a spectator, or a participant. 
Compared to other sports, action sports are unique; in Skateboarding and BMX, 
athletes as young as thirteen are competing as professionals, and amateur athletes 
in these sports are starting at even younger ages. Arbitration and arbitration 
                                                 
* Rachel Bires is a 2011 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State University 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1 JOE TOMLINSON, EXTREME SPORTS (Carlton Publishing Group 2002). 
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provisions are a viable and important option for agreements that will benefit these 
sports, the athletes that compete, and the companies that invest in both these sports 
and the athletes. Arbitration agreements in the governing bodies of these sports, in 
the competitions in which the athletes compete, and in the endorsement agreements 
these athletes contract into, would benefit both the sports and the athletes involved.  
 
II. ISSUES IN SPORTS ARBITRATION 
 
A. Endorsement Contracts 
 
Many action sports athletes have received lucrative endorsement contracts 
with major companies. Shaun White, a professional skateboarder and snowboarder, 
has or has had endorsement deals with large companies such as Burton 
Snowboards, Target, Red Bull, Oakley, Inc, and Hewlett-Packard.2 There are also 
many other athletes who may be less known to the general public that have 
endorsement contracts with major equipment, clothing, shoe, and energy drink 
companies. Additionally, other, non-traditional, companies are investing their 
money in actions sports athletes.  For example, Skullcandy, a headphone company, 
sponsors several Skateboarders and BMX riders.3 
Many of these athletes may not be privy to the legalities involved in their 
endorsement contract; rather, these athletes may be entrusting these agreements 
with management companies or agents. While there are no cases involving action 
sports athletes and their endorsement agreements, there are some cases involving 
athletes in other sports that may shed some light on issues involving action sports 
athletes and their endorsement contracts.  
Track and Field athletes are similar to action sports athletes in that they 
sometimes compete individually, even against their own ‘teammates,’ and also 
                                                 
2 Shaun White Official Website, http://www.shaunwhite.com (last visited November 21, 
2010). 
3 Skull Candy, http://www.skullcandy.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
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enter into endorsement contracts individually. In Hicks v. HSInternational Sports 
Management, Inc.,4 the United States District Court for the District of Oregon held 
that if all of the claims brought by a Plaintiff fall within an agreement to arbitrate, 
the court must grant the motion to compel arbitration, particularly when the 
Plaintiff claims that the entire agreement is void; that claim is for the arbitrator to 
decide, not the courts.5 Kevin Hicks, a track and field athlete, signed with 
HSInternational Sports Management, Inc. (“HIS”) to act as his agent.6 In the 
agreement, Hicks agreed to pay HSI fifteen percent of the “money received in 
connection with fees, bonuses, and prize money in exchange for HSI’s best efforts 
to negotiate his contracts and manage his racing career.”7 Hicks entered into a four 
and a half year contract with Nike, which was to begin on July 1, 2005.8 The 
contract provided for reductions in Hicks’ base salary if he failed to participate in a 
requisite number of events or if he “failed to attain certain results” in these events.9  
When HSI failed to enter Hicks into the requisite number of events that were 
necessary to meet the standards of the Nike contract, Nike reduced Hicks’ base 
salary.10 In March 2008, Hicks terminated his management agreement with HSI in 
writing, claiming that HSI violated California law by “failing to make appropriate 
filings and by failing to make required disclosures in the management 
agreement.”11 Hicks further sought a declaration that the management agreement is 
void and unenforceable, and because his claims arose out of HSI’s conduct and did 
not relate to the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement, he is not subject to 
binding arbitration.12 The agreement in issue provided, in part: 
 
                                                 
4 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138 (2009). 
5 Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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Dispute Resolution: If ATTORNEY/AGENT and CLIENT 
are unable to reach an agreement regarding a dispute 
between them arising out of this retention, the dispute shall 
be subject to binding arbitration to be held in Orange 
County, California before a retired California Superior Court 
judge. Judgment on the arbitrator’s award shall be final and 
binding and may be entered in any competent court.13 
 
Hicks sought to avoid this provision specifically because he argued that his claims 
arose out of HSI’s conduct, which Hicks argued resulted in harm to him in 
violation of tort law and state statute.14 Hicks argued that his claims were not 
related to the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement with HSI.15 The court 
stated that because some of Hick’s claims depend on an interpretation of the 
contractual agreement, the claims are arbitrable.16 The court additionally stated that 
because the arbitration provision was drafted in a way that was not limited only to 
disputes arising out of the agreement, but also to disputes arising out of the 
“retention which resulted in the agreement”, Congress’ intent requires the court to 
“liberally interpret the clause in favor of arbitration.”17 The Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) reflects Congress’ intent to “provide for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.”18 The FAA “embodies 
a clear federal policy in favor of arbitration,”19 and “any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”20 
Additionally, “a court, in construing a valid arbitration agreement under the FAA, 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (citing Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.3d 469, 475 (9th cir. 1991) 
(citing Prerry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987))). 
19 Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. (discussing 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
20 Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983)). 
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applies ordinary principles of state contract law to determine whether the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.”21 The court in Hicks, noting that the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of  “retention,” states that this 
provision refers not only to “disputes involving interpretation and performance of 
the agreement, but also to disputes regarding the hiring process, disclosures, and 
other matters related to the contract.”22 As the parties did not limit the disputes to 
“claims involving interpretation and performance of the contract, the factual 
allegations raised in the complaint need only touch upon matters covered by the 
contract.”23 The matters on which the allegations must touch upon not only include 
issues regarding the formation of the contract, but also “any violations of law in 
connection therewith.”24 Since Hicks did not argue that the arbitration clause was 
void or unconscionable, but that the entire agreement was void, the court states that 
an arbitrator, and not the court, must determine such claims.25 
 The Hicks case illustrates the need for arbitral clauses in endorsement 
contracts that are narrower in scope. If Hicks and HSI had limited the scope of the 
agreement to disputes regarding only the interpretation and performance of the 
agreement, not disputes arising out of the retention that resulted in the agreement, 
Hicks may have had a cause of action in the court. As many professional action 
sports athletes have endorsement agreements, a dispute resolution clause with a 
more limited scope may be more beneficial in order to protect the parties involved, 
allowing them to properly vindicate their claims. 
                                                 
21 Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. 
25 Id. 
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B. Olympic Arbitration 
 
Although Skateboarding and BMX are not currently Olympic sports, there 
is a possibility that they will be in the future due to their increasing popularity both 
nationally and internationally. When these sports become an Olympic sport, they 
will have to be recognized by Olympic Committees in their respective countries, 
and submit themselves to the constitution and bylaws of these committees, 
including their dispute resolution provisions. In the United States, these sports 
would need to be recognized by the USOC in accordance with the Ted Stevens 
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. 
Under the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (Stevens Act),26 
qualification for membership in the USOC is provided in the constitution and 
bylaws of the committee.27 Sections 220504(b)(1)-(4) of the Act states that the 
committee “shall establish and maintain provisions with respect to its governance 
and the conduct of its affairs for reasonable representation of”28 “amateur sports 
organizations recognized as national governing bodies,”29 “amateur athletes 
actively engaged in amateur athletic competition or who have represented the 
United States in international amateur athletic competition within the preceding ten 
years,”30 “amateur sports organizations that conduct a national program or regular 
national amateur athletic competition in two or more sports included on the 
program for the Olympic games,”31 or “individuals not affiliated or associated with 
                                                 
26The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (1998). 
(This act governs the USOC, and puts for requirements and procedures for its member 
national governing bodies for individual sports). 
27 36 U.S.C. § 220504(a). 
28 Id. § 220504(b). 
29 Id. § 220504(b)(1). 
30 Id. § 220504(b)(2). 
31 Id. § 220504(b)(3). 
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any amateur sports organization who, in the committee’s judgment, represent the 
interests of the American public in the activities of the corporation.”32 
 Under the Act, the committee shall establish and maintain provisions in its 
constitution and bylaws for the “swift and equitable resolution of disputes 
involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity of an amateur athlete, 
coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in the Olympic 
games…world championship competition, or other protected competition as 
defined in the constitution and bylaws.”33 The Act states that the committee “shall 
hire and provide salary, benefits, and administrative expenses for an Ombudsman 
for athletes”34 that shall “provide independent advice to athletes at no cost about 
the applicable provisions of the act and the constitution and bylaws of the 
committee…with respect to resolution of any dispute”35 as discussed in the 
previous section, assist in mediating any such disputes,36 and report to the 
Athletes’ Advisory Council on a regular basis.37 A party that is aggrieved by a 
determination of the committee, under section 220527 (Complaints against 
national governing bodies) or section 220528 (Applications to replace an 
incumbent national governing body) of the act, “may obtain review of the claims 
by any regional office of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).”38 The 
arbitral clause of the act provides the following procedures: that the “demand for 
arbitration must be submitted within thirty days of the committee’s 
determination;”39 that “upon receipt the AAA must serve notice to both parties and 
immediately proceed with arbitration according to their commercial rules;”40 that 
“the panel shall consist of three arbitrators unless the parties agree to a lesser 
                                                 
32 36 U.S.C. § 220504(b)(4). 
33 Id. § 220509(a). 
34 Id. § 220509(b)(1). 
35 Id. § 220509(b)(1)(A). 
36 Id. § 220504(b)(1)(B) 
37 36 U.S.C. § 220504(b)(1)(C). 
38 Id. § 220529(a). 
39 Id. § 220529(b)(1). 
40 Id. § 220529(b)(2). 
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number;”41 that “the AAA shall select the site unless the parties agree to the use of 
another site;”42 that “the arbitration hearing shall be open to the public;”43 that “the 
decision shall be by majority vote unless the parties require concurrence of all 
arbitrators;”44 “relaxed conformity to the legal rules of evidence;”45 “settlement of 
the dispute before a final award;”46 a final and binding decision;47 and “a reopening 
of hearings.”48 When either Skateboarding or BMX have a national governing 
body recognized by the USOC as eligible for membership, these sports would not 
only be required to follow the constitution and bylaws of the committee, but also 
the provisions for dispute resolution, including arbitration, as provided for by the 
Act. 
If, after being recognized as eligible for membership by the USOC, the 
member and the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA, 
the arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’ 
agreement as discussed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decision in Jacobs v. USA Track & Field and United States Anti-Doping 
Agency.,49 In Jacobs, a “world-class” track athlete appealed from the denial by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of her petition 
to compel arbitration regarding a dispute with defendants regarding a doping 
violation and a suspension from the 2004 Olympic Games.50 The parties agreed to 
arbitrate their dispute, but there was a disagreement over which two sets of rules of 
the AAA, Commercial Rules or Supplementary Procedures, governs the 
arbitration.51 Although the parties agreed that it is for the arbitrators to decide 
                                                 
41 Id. § 220529(b)(2)(A). 
42 36 U.S.C. § 220529(b)(2)(B). 
43 Id. § 220529(b)(2)(C). 
44 Id. § 220529(b)(3). 
45 Id. § 220529(b)(5). 
46 Id. § 220529(c). 
47 36 U.S.C. § 220529(d). 
48 Id. § 220529(e). 
49 374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004). 
50 Id. at 86. 
51 Id 
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which set of rules applies, each set of rules provides different methods for selecting 
arbitrators.52 Therefore, Jacobs petitioned for a court order, pursuant to section four 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), to compel the arbitration to proceed under 
a particular set of AAA rules that the AAA has determined are inapplicable.53 
Jacobs, a member of USA Track and Field (“USATF”), an organization 
recognized by the USOC as the national governing body for track and field in the 
United States, has agreed to follow the rules and regulations of the USATF and 
USOC.54 The United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) is the “independent 
anti-doping organization recognized by the USOC for Olympic Sports in the 
United States, and is responsible for managing the testing of athletes to determine 
the presence of prohibited substances.”55 After a competition in 2003, Jacobs 
provided a urine sample to the USADA and tested positive for 
tetrahydrogestrinone (“THG”), an anabolic steroid that is prohibited under anti-
doping rules.56 She was then charged with a doping violation and threatened with 
sanctions, which included a “four-year period of ineligibility in the Olympic 
Games, trials, or qualifying events.”57 Jacobs, denying the charges, filed a Demand 
for Arbitration with the New York Regional Office of the AAA in order to compel 
arbitration under the Commercial Rules.58 The USADA then wrote to the AAA 
stating that the “USADA considers [petitioner’s] Demand for Arbitration as notice 
that [she] contests the sanction [proposed by USADA] and requests a hearing 
under the USADA Protocol and applicable AAA Supplementary Procedures for 
Arbitration Initiated by USADA.”59 The parties then sent briefs to the AAA on the 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307). 
54 Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 87. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 87. 
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issue of which rules the arbitration should proceed under.60 The AAA then notified 
Jacobs that arbitration would proceed under the Supplementary Procedures.61  
Jacobs then filed a petition to compel arbitration in the District Court seeking to 
compel arbitration under the Commercial Rules.62 The District Court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction and denied the petition.63 The Court reviewed USOC and 
USATF bylaws and regulations and concluded that “the USATF has conflicting 
requirements for the adjudication of alleged doping offenses…”64 The Court then 
observed that “both the Commercial Rules and Supplementary 
Procedures…include precisely the same rule with respect to the question of 
whether the Court or the arbitrator determines questions of arbitrability.”65 Both 
sets of rules provide: 
 
(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her 
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect 
to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration 
agreement.  
(b) The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the 
existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration 
clause forms a part. Such an arbitration clause shall be 
treated as an agreement independent of the terms of the 
contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract is 
null and void shall not for that reason alone render 
invalid the arbitration clause.66 
 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 88. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (citing Commercial Rules, Rule 7; Supplementary Procedures, Rule 8). 
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The Court stated that whichever set of rules applied, “the parties have agreed that 
all questions of arbitrability, including the validity and scope of the arbitration 
agreement are reserved for arbitral rather than court determination” in its 
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction.67 On appeal, Jacobs argues that the District 
Court should have granted her petition to compel arbitration under the Commercial 
Rules.68 Although Jacobs agrees that it is for the arbitrators to decide which set of 
rules to apply, she argues that “the arbitrators must be selected initially under the 
Commercial Rules.”69 The Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of 
the petition de novo.70 
 Jacobs sought to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA, 
which provides: 
 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal 
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for 
arbitration may petition any United States district court…for 
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner 
provided for in such agreement…The court shall hear the 
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith 
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement.71 
 
Under the FAA, “the role of courts is ‘limited to determining two issues: i) 
whether a valid agreement or obligation to arbitrate exists, and ii) whether one 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4). 
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party to the agreement has failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate.’”72 In Jacobs, 
the parties did not refuse to arbitrate; therefore the Court stated that it “need not 
interpret the terms of the parties’ agreement.”73 The fact that the USATF and the 
USADA, before the AAA, objected to Jacob’s Demand for Arbitration did not 
constitute a “refusal to arbitration.”74 Since there was no refusal to arbitrate, the 
Court states that Jacobs “cannot use Section 4 as a vehicle to seek review of the 
AAA’s decision about how to proceed with the arbitration process.”75 Therefore, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the District Court correctly denied her petition to 
compel arbitration.76  
 The Jacobs case illustrates that once an athlete is a participant in a sport 
that has a national governing body recognized by the USOC and the member and 
the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA, the 
arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’ 
agreement.77 This has important implications for any sport that wishes to be 
recognized by the USOC. When Skateboarding and BMX form gain their 
respective national governing bodies that are recognized by the USOC, these sports 
will also have to submit to the dispute resolution procedures of the USOC, and an 
arbitration panel, not the courts, will interpret their agreements.  
In Lindland v. USA Wrestling Association, Inc.,78 a case involving athletes 
that compete individually similar to the athletes of action sports, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that if the USOC is in “active 
concert or participation with a governing body,” it is bound by an order or 
injunction by the court regarding arbitration awards.79 Matt Lindland, a Greco-
                                                 
72 Id. (citing Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1998 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
73 Id.  
74 Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000). 
79 Id. at 1006. 
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Roman wrestler, wrestled Keith Sieracki in two championship matches to 
determine who would gain a spot on the Olympic team for the 2000 Summer 
Olympic Games.80 Sieracki won the first match 2-1 and Lindland won the second 
match 8-0.81 Lindland, under section 220529(a), a dispute resolution provision of 
the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, protested the result of the first 
match through USA Wrestling, which is the governing body of amateur wrestling 
in the United States.82 The arbitrator for this dispute ordered that Sieracki and 
Lindland enter into a rematch.83 As the winner of the rematch, Lindland was to be 
the representative in the Olympic Games, but USA Wrestling did not accept that 
outcome and instead told the USOC to send Sieracki as its nominee, and to list 
Lindland as an alternate in the event of injury.84 Lindland then sought confirmation 
of the arbitration award under section nine of the FAA.85 The Seventh Circuit in 
that case held that Lindland is entitled to relief, which means being entitled to be 
the USA Wrestling nominee.86 USA Wrestling defied this order, as it had defied 
the arbitration award. The reasoning given by USA Wrestling for defying the order 
was that a second arbitrator, in an arbitration proceeding initiated by Sieracki, 
directed USA Wrestling to send Sieracki as its nominee based on the results of the 
first match, in which Sieracki had won.87 The court then issued a writ of mandamus 
requiring that the district court ensure that the first arbitration award was 
implemented “immediately and unconditionally,” as USA Wrestling had decided 
to follow the second arbitration reward, which was un-reviewed, rather than 
following the decision of a federal court confirming the first award.88 Although 
USA Wrestling had agreed to comply with the court order, the USOC refused to 
                                                 
80 Id. at 1001. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1002. 
83 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002. 
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send Lindland as its nominee, because it had already sent Sieracki as its nominee 
to the International Olympic Committee (IOC).89 Lindland returned to court to 
compel the USOC to send his name as the nominee instead of Sieracki, and 
Sieracki responded by asking a different district court to confirm the second 
arbitration award.90 The proceedings arising out of the dispute were consolidated 
and transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, which ordered the USOC to 
request that the IOC accept Lindland as its nominee instead of Sieracki.91 The 
USOC complied with the order and Sieracki appealed, once again seeking to have 
the second arbitration award confirmed.92 Although the deadline had passed for 
changes to the roster of Olympic teams, since the IOC has already accepted the 
substitution of Lindland for Sieracki after the deadline, the court stated that it 
would still address whether or not to confirm the second arbitration award.93 The 
confirmation of the award would substitute Sieracki for Lindland once again, and 
the court states that since the USOC was willing to make the first change after the 
deadline, it would impliedly accept a second change as well.94  
The court stated that the second arbitration award could not be confirmed 
because the second arbitrator has directed USA Wrestling not to implement the 
decision of the first arbitrator. As the first award had already been enforced, the 
court could not enforce the second award because the enforcement of incompatible 
awards is precluded under Consolidation Coal v. United Mine Workers.95 Even if 
the second arbitration award had been the only award, the award could not be 
confirmed because the second arbitrator acted ultra vires and violated the 
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.96 The Stevens Act, 
under section 220529(a), does not authorize a second arbitration proceeding 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (citing Consolidation Coal v. United Mine Works, 213 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
96 Id. at 1003. 
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regarding the “propriety of another arbitrator’s decision.”97 Section 220529(a) 
states: 
 
A party aggrieved by a determination of the corporation 
under section 220527 or 220528 of this title may obtain 
review by any regional office of the American Arbitration 
Association.98  
 
As the first arbitrator is not considered a corporation under the Stevens Act,99 his 
determination was not arbitrable under the Act.100 Additionally, the first arbitrator 
did not render his decision under section 220527, dealing with remedies that 
athletes have within their governing bodies, or under section 220528, dealing with 
applications to replace national governing bodies.101 Therefore, a review of the first 
determination could not be obtained under the act, and the second arbitration 
award was not entitled to confirmation.102 
 The Lindland case illustrates issues of dispute resolution that can arise 
within national governing bodies, as well as the USOC, in Olympic team selection. 
This case could have very important implications for action sports athletes that 
wish to compete in the Olympic games, not only in terms of the proper selection 
procedures for national governing bodies, but for the dispute resolution procedures 
to follow under the USOC and the Stevens Act. 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1004 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a)). 
99 Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. §220501). 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Hicks v. HSInternational Sports Mgmt., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Endorsement Contracts 
 
The Hicks case describes a need to narrowly tailor the scope of an 
arbitration clause in order to avoid problems such as the problems experienced by 
Hicks.103 In that case, Hicks brought several claims against his agent. Hicks argued 
that because some of the claims do not involve the interpretation of the agreement, 
the claims are not arbitrable. The Court, however, stated that because the 
arbitration provision was drafted in a way that was not limited only to disputes 
arising out of the agreement, but also disputes arising out of the retention that 
resulted in the agreement, Congress’ intent required the court to liberally interpret 
the clause in favor of arbitration.104 The Hicks case illustrates the need for 
management agreements and endorsement contracts to be drafted in such a way 
that limits the scope of the issues that can be brought before an arbitrator or before 
the courts.105 This is particularly applicable in the world of Skateboarding and 
BMX as some of these athletes have procured major endorsement deals with major 
companies. Additionally, some of these athletes also have personal agents 
representing them to these companies. If the agreements between the athlete and 
their agents, or the athlete and the company they are endorsing, do not limit what 
can be submitted to arbitration or to the courts, one of the parties may not be able 
to properly vindicate their claims or receive the remedies in which they seek.106  
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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B. Olympic Arbitration 
 
If either Skateboarding or BMX had a national governing body recognized 
by the USOC as eligible for membership, which neither have currently, they would 
not only be required to follow the constitution and bylaws of the committee, but 
also the provisions for dispute resolution including arbitration as provided for by 
the Act. If, after being recognized as eligible for membership by the USOC, the 
member and the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA, 
the arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’ 
agreement as evidenced by the Court in the Jacobs case. Skateboarding and BMX 
have potential to be included as an Olympic sport, as the action sport of 
snowboarding is currently an Olympic sport. Both Skateboarding and BMX have 
gained international popularity and each sport has superstar athletes. With the 
potential to be an event in the international Olympic games, Skateboarding and 
BMX each need to have a national governing body to be recognized by the USOC. 
Following the recognition as a national governing body, these sports would be 
required to form their own rules and regulations as well as follow the constitution 
and bylaws of the USOC and the provisions of the Ted Stevens Amateur and 
Olympic Sports Act, including the provisions related to dispute resolution and 
arbitration. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Skateboarding and BMX would benefit from having arbitration 
agreements in the governing bodies of these sports, in the competitions in which 
the athletes of these sports compete, and in the endorsement agreements the 
athletes of these sports contract into. With the growing popularity of these sports 
on an international level, the issues described above will undoubtedly come into 
play. As the popularity continues to grow, the need for agents for many of its 
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athletes to assist in the garnishing of endorsement contracts will also grow. 
Additionally, as the popularity of these sports continues to rise, potential issues 
arising in dispute resolution, including arbitration, will also increase. The 
increasing need for dispute resolution provisions in the contracts of these athletes 
will require a greater understanding of the arbitration process in order to better 
protect and benefit all of the parties involved. 
